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Abstract. In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of
view that are well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular, we
consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995),
the Public Help index (Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also
called the Zipke index (Nevison et al., 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper
are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a
new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some characterizations
of the new index and values.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A value for n-person cooperative games is a function able to represent a reasonable
expectation of the sharing of global winnings amongst the players. A power index is
a value for a particular class of games called simple games. The power indices approach
is widely used to measure a priori voting power of members of a committee. The
concept of value was introduced for the first time by Lloyd Stowell Shapley in (1953).
The following year, Shapley and Martin Shubik introduced the “Shapley and Shubik
power index” (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). Since 1954, numerous remarkable power
indices have been introduced in the literature for simple games. These power indices are
based on diverse bargaining models and/or axiomatic assumptions. Some indices have
been derived from existing values; i.e., the Shapley and Shubik (1954) as well as
the Banzhaf (1965) and the Coleman (1971). Other power indices were formulated
exclusively for simple games; i.e., the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Deegan
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and Packel index (1978), and the Johnston index (1978). In this paper, we analyze
some values and power indices well-defined in the social context where the goods are
public; e.g., the Public Good index, the Public Good value, the Public Help index
(Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also called the Zipke
index (Nevison et al., 1978), and the Rae index (1969). We also introduce an extension
of the Public Help index as a game value and a new power index with its extension as
a game value. Some properties of the new proposed index and values are given.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and preliminary
definitions that refer to cooperative games, simple games, and several properties of
power indices. The power indices considered in this paper, as well as a new proposed
power index, are described in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to comparing the
considered power indices from the point of view of some desirable properties. Section 5
presents the normalized and absolute Public good value and the propositions of the
extension of the Public Help index, as well as a new index to the game value. The
paper ends with Section 6 devoted to concluding remarks and further developments.
The appendix, at the end of the paper, contains proof of the identity that serves
to demonstrate that the new index proposed in this paper satisfies the dominance
property.
2. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Let N = {1, 2,. . . , n} be a finite set of players. Any subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition,
N is called the grand coalition, and ∅ is called an empty coalition. By |S |, we denote
the number of members of S : therefore; e.g., |N |= n. A cooperative game is a pair
(N, v) where v : 2N › R, the characteristic function, is a real-valued function from the
set of all possible coalitions of players of N to the real number set such that v(∅) = 0.
For every coalition S, v(S ) is called the worth of S. A cooperative game v is monotonic
if v(S) ≤ v(T ) if S ⊂ T ⊆ N .
If v takes values only in the set {0, 1}, then it is called a simple monotonic game.
By SN , we denote the set of all simple monotonic games on N.
A player i ∈ S, in a simple game v, is crucial or pivotal, for the coalition S, if
v(S ) = 1 and v(S \{i}) = 0.
In a simple game, coalitions S with v(S) = 1 are called winning coalitions and
coalitions with v(S) = 0 losing coalitions. By W (or W (v)), we denote the set of all
winning coalitions, and by Wi, we denote the set of all winning coalitions to which
player i belongs.
If a player does not belong to any winning coalition, then he is called a zero player.
A null game is a simple game such that v(S) = 0 ∀S ⊆ N . Naturally, in any null game,
each player is a zero player.
In a minimal winning coalition, all players are crucial. By Wm or Wm(v), we
denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions in v, and by Wmi , we denote the set
of all minimal winning coalitions to which player i belongs.
Either the family of winning coalitions W or the subfamily of minimal winning
coalitions Wm determines the game.
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If a player is not contained in any minimal winning coalition (i.e. i /∈ S ∀S ∈Wm),
then he is called a null player.
A weighted game (also called a weighted majority game), [q; w1, ... , wn] is a simple
game v ∈ SN with real weights wi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N and a non-negative quota q,
∑
i∈N wi
2 <
q ≤∑i∈N wi, such that v(S) = 1⇔ w(S) = ∑i∈S wi ≥ q.
A value is a function f that assigns a payoff distribution f(v) ∈ Rn to every
cooperative game v. The real number fi(v) is the “value” of the player i ∈ N in the
game v according to f.
A power index is a function f : SN > Rn that assigns to any simple game v vector
f(v) = (f1(v), f2(v), . . . , fn(v)) (or equivalently f(W ) = (f1(W ), f2(W ), . . . , fn(W ))).
The non-negative real number fi(v) (or fi(W )) is interpreted as a “power” of the
corresponding player i ∈ N .
There are some properties that are desirable postulates of power indices. Below,
we quote only: efficiency, non-negativity, null player, symmetry, dominance, and bloc
properties.
If
∑
i/∈N fi(v) = 1 for all v ∈ SN , we said that power index f satisfies the efficiency
postulate. A power index f satisfies the non-negativity postulate (or positivity postulate)
if fi(v) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and any v ∈ SN . A power index f satisfies the null
player postulate if fi(v) = 0 for each null player i ∈ N and all v ∈ SN . If for all
v ∈ SN and for each i ∈ N and each permutation pi : N → N fi(v) = fpi(i)(pi(v))
where (pi(v))(S) = v(pi−1(S)), then we said that power index f satisfies the symmetry
postulate (also called anonymity postulate). Let v : [q; w1, ... , wn] be an arbitrary
weighted game. A power index f satisfies the dominance (or local monotonicity)
postulate if wi ≥ wj ⇒ fi(v) ≥ fj(v) for any distinct players i, j ∈ N . Note that, in
the literature for simple games, there is also a stronger version of dominance property
(called D-dominance or strong dominance) than is presented here; see, for example,
(Felsenthal and Machover, 1995; Bertini et al., 2013a).
Consider a weighted game W : [q; w1, ... , wn]. Let i and j be two distinct players
in W and j is not null. If players i and j form a bloc i&j (i.e., a new entity not
belonging to N ) and operate as a single player, then a new game arises which we denote
by W [i&j ]. The new game W [i&j ] is obtain from W by removing two players i and j
and introducing a new player representing the bloc i&j. The quota q stays as there
was in W. Any player k ∈ N\{i, j} is also a player in W [i&j ] with the same weight,
and the weight of the bloc is equal to the sum of the weights of players i and j ; i.e.,
wi&j = (wi+wj). A power index f satisfies the bloc property if fi&j(W [i&j]) ≥ fi(W ).
3. POWER INDICES
In this section, we recall the definitions of the Public Good index, the Public Help
index, the König and Bräuninger index, and the Rae index. In Section 3.5, we introduce
a new index. The indices considered here are based on winning or minimal winning
coalitions and were originally formulated only for simple games.
Henceforth, all the games considered are monotonic and not null.
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3.1. THE RAE INDEX
The Rae index, R, was introduced by Rae in (1969). The Rae index of a simple game
W for player i is defined as follows:
Ri(W ) =
|{S : i ∈ S ∈W}|
2n
+
|{S : i /∈ S /∈W}|
2n
We remark that this index is equivalent to the Brams and Lake index (1978); see
also (Nevison, 1979; Mercik, 1997). There is an affine relation between the absolute
Banzhaf and Rae indices; see Dubey and Shapley (1979). Thus, the Rae index can be
given by the following formula:
Ri(W ) =
1
2
+
2|Wi| − |W |
2n
3.2. THE KÖNIG AND BRÄUNINGER’S INDEX (OR ZIPKE INDEX)
Nevison, Zicht, Schoepke in (1978) introduced a power index under the name Zipke
index. Then, König and Bräuninger in (1998) reinvented it. In the literature, this index
is also called the inclusiveness index, and it can been seen as a measure of success
(see, for example, Laruelle, Valenciano, 2011). The König and Bräuninger index, KB,
of a simple game W for a player i is defined by:
KBi(W ) =
|Wi|
|W |
3.3. THE PUBLIC GOOD INDEX
The Public Good index (PGI) was defined by Holler in (1982). The PGI considers the
coalition value to be a public good. The (relative) PGI of a simple game W for player
i ∈ N is given by:
hi(W ) =
|Wmi |∑
j∈N
∣∣Wmj ∣∣
The PGI index is also called the Holler-Packel index due to the axiomatization of
Holler and Packel (1983). Napel in (1999), (2001) showed the independence and
non-redundancy of the Holler and Packel axioms.
The absolute Public Good index of simple game W for arbitrary player i is defined
as follows:
hi(W ) = |Wmi |
For the extension of the PGI index to a game value, see Section 5.
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3.4. THE PUBLIC HELP INDEX θ
Bertini, Gambarelli and Stach in (2008) introduced the Public Help index (PHI) as
a modification of the Public Good index. This index considers that, in assigning
a power to a given player i, all of the winning coalitions containing player i (unlike
the PGI index, which only takes minimal winning coalitions into account). Indeed,
sometimes every winning coalition is relevant to the bargaining. The Public Help
index, θ of a non-null simple game W for a player i ∈ N is given by:
θi(W ) =
|Wi|∑
j∈N
|Wj |
In the case of a null game W, this index is θi(W ) = 0 for any player i. In (Bertini
et al., 2008) an axiomatic characterization of the PHI θ index was provided. For its
generalization to a game value, see Section 5.
The absolute PHI θ of a simple game W for a player i ∈ N is the same as the
absolute KB index, and is defined for a given simple game v and a player i ∈ N as
the number of all winning coalitions containing player i, as follows:
θi(W ) = KBi(W ) = |Wi|
Note that, after the adequate normalization of the KB index, we obtain the PHI
θ index:
KBi∑
j∈N
KBj
=
|Wi|∑
j∈N
|Wj | = θi(W )
3.5. THE PUBLIC HELP INDEX ξ (PHI ξ)
In this section, we introduce a new power index PHI ξ . The PHI ξ index, like the KB
and PHI θ indices, takes into account all winning coalitions, but it assumes that the
probability of forming a winning coalition is inversely proportional to its cardinality
and that the players divide the spoils equally in a winning coalition. The Public Help
index ξ , for a non-null game W and i ∈ N , is defined as follows:
ξi(W ) =
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S| ∑
T∈W
1
|T |
1
|S| =
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2
In the case of a null game W, this index is ξi(W ) = 0 for any player i. Note that each
coalition S is formed with probability 1|S|∑T∈W 1|T | , which is inversely proportional to
the cardinality of S. Therefore, the PHI ξ index can be seen as a hybrid between the
PHI index and the Deegan-Packel index.
Justification for introducing the Public Help index ξ is similar to the PHI θ. In
assigning the power to players, both indices consider all winning coalitions, not only the
minimal wining coalitions as in the PGI. For this reason, ξ and θ rather describe power
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relations in the consumption of public goods, whereas the PGI analyzes the production
of public goods. In production, one has to take care that free-riding is excluded; that is
why the PGI considers minimal winning coalitions and in consumption of public goods
you cannot avoid free-riding. That is why the Public Help indices give values even
to null players. Moreover, ξ (thanks to its formula) gives more power to the winning
coalitions with a lower number of members than θ . Thus, the players who contribute
to success of less-numerous coalitions obtain more power, and, as a, consequence, null
players obtain less power (see Example 4.2).
The absolute PHI ξ of a game W for player i ∈ N , is given by:
ξi(W ) =
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2
4. COMPARISON OF POWER INDICES
In this section, we compare the KB, PGI, PHI θ, PHI ξ, and Rae power indices, taking
into account:
– some desirable properties introduced in Section 2,
– the range of power indices, and
– two examples (4.1 and 4.2).
The König and Bräuninger, Rae, and PHI θ indices are more or less related to
the Banzhaf index. The Rae and KB indices satisfy the non-negativity, symmetry,
dominance, and bloc postulates but violate the efficiency and null player properties.
While the range of values of R and KB indices is the same, and is as follows: [0.5; 1].
The Public Good index fulfills the efficiency, non-negativity, symmetry, and null
postulates but does not satisfy the dominance and bloc properties. All of the above
facts written in this paragraph can be found, for example, in (Bertini et al., 2013a).
The index θ satisfies the efficiency, positivity, and symmetry properties but does
not satisfy the null player property. The efficiency and symmetry properties are among
the axiomatic characterization of the PHI θ; see (Bertini et al., 2008). Felsenthal and
Machover in (1995) demonstrated that, if an index satisfies transfer property, then it
also satisfies the dominance postulate. The PHI θ does not satisfy transfer property
(see Bertini et al., 2013a), but it satisfies the dominance property (see Theorem 4.1).
Theorem 4.1. PHI θ satisfies the dominance property for any weighted game v ∈ SN .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary weighted majority game v : [q; w1, ... , wn] and two distinct
players i, j ∈ N with weights wi, wj such that wi ≥ wj . Note that Wi (and also Wj)
includes a non-empty subset, Wi∪j , of all winning coalitions that contain players i
and j. Namely, Wi∪j = {S ∈ W : i ∈ S ∧ j ∈ S} and Wi∪j ⊂ Wi and Wi∪j ⊂ Wj .
If wi ≥ wj then for any non-empty coalition S ∈ Wj\Wi∪j (i.e., i /∈ S), we have
(S\{j}) ∪ {i} ∈Wi: thus, |Wi| ≥ |Wj |.
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From this, we immediately attain that PHI satisfies the dominance postulate:
θi(W ) =
|Wi|∑
k∈N
|Wk|
≥ |Wj |∑
k∈N
|Wk|
= θj(W )
Kurz in (2014) estimated that the individual power of a player i ∈ N calculated
by θ is in the following range: 12n ≤ θi(v) ≤ 2n for any simple game v. In this paper,
we show that such an interval is narrower (see Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 4.2. For any simple game v ∈ SN , we have 12n−1 ≤ θi(v) ≤ 2n+1 for any
i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider a simple game v with N and an arbitrary player i ∈ N . Let us split
the set of all winning coalitions into two distinct sets: W = Wi ∪ (W\Wi). Thus,
|W | = |Wi|+ |W\Wi|,
∑
j∈N |Wj | =
∑
S∈W |S| =
∑
S∈Wi |S|+
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S|, and:
θi(W ) =
|Wi|∑
S∈Wi
|S|+ ∑
S∈(W\Wi)
|S| (1)
We remark that, for any simple game, if S ∈ (W\Wi) then S ∪{i} ∈Wi which implies
|Wi| ≥ |W\Wi| and, as a consequence, also
∑
S∈Wi |S| ≥
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S|.
Firstly, we demonstrate that the minimal power that an arbitrary player i can
obtain in a simple game is equal to 12n−1 . The PHI index θ for player i has a minimal
value if the denominator of (1) attains a maximal value and the numerator of (1) attains
a minimal value. The maximal value of denominator (1) is attain for maximal values of
both summands
∑
S∈Wi |S| and
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S|. The summand
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S| attains
a maximal value when for any S ∈Wi also S\{i} ∈ (W\Wi).
In this case, we have
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S| =
∑
S∈Wi(|S| − 1) =
∑
S∈Wi |S| − |Wi|, and
we can rewrite (1) as follows:
θi(W ) =
|Wi|
2
∑
S∈Wi
|S| − |Wi| (2)
Since v(N) = 1 for any non-null game v ∈ SN , we see that the minimal value
of |Wi|is equal to 1 for any i ∈ N . Suppose that |Wi| = 1. Thus, we have that∑
S∈Wi |S| = |N | = n. Now, in (2), substituting 1 for |Wi|and n for
∑
S∈Wi |S|, we
conclude:
1
2n− 1 ≤ θi(W ) for any i ∈ N
Now, let us demonstrate that the maximal power that θ can assign to a player i∈N
is equal to 2n+1 . The PHI index θ for player i has a maximal value if the denominator
of (1) attains the minimal value and the numerator of (1) attains a maximal value.
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The denominator of (1) attains its minimum value if
∑
S∈(W\Wi) |S| = 0. Whereas,
|Wi|(i.e., numerator of (1)) attains its maximum value when all coalitions with
player i are winning (it also means that player i is a dictator). Since there are
2n−1 coalitions that contain player i, we see that the maximum value of numerator (1)
is equal to |Wi| = 2n−1 and
∑
S∈Wi |S| =
∑n
k=1 k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
. Applying, for example,
the binomial identity (1 + x)n =
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk ∀x ∈ R, it could be proven that∑n
k=1 k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
= (n + 1)2n−2 (for a full demonstration, see the Appendix). Now
replacing in (1) |Wi| with 2n−1,
∑
S∈Wi |S| with (n+1)2n−2 and
∑
S∈W\Wi |S| with 0,
we immediately attain θi(W ) ≤ |Wi|∑
S∈Wi |S|
= 2
n−1
(n+1)2n−2 =
2
(n+1) .
Let us consider the new index ξ introduced in Section 3.5. We will prove
that the newly proposed index PHI ξ satisfies the following properties: efficiency,
non-negativity, symmetry, and dominance (see Theorems 4.3–4.6).
Theorem 4.3. PHI ξ satisfies the efficiency postulate:
∑
i∈N
ξi(W ) =
{
1 if W is not the null game
0 otherwise.
Proof. Let W be a game with a set of players N. If W is a null game, each player is
a zero player, so
∑
i∈N ξi(W ) = 0. While for a non-null game W, we attain:∑
i∈N
ξi(W ) =
∑
i∈N
(
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2
)
=
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
i∈N
( ∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2
)
=
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
( ∑
S∈W1
1
|S|2 +
∑
S∈W2
1
|S|2 + ...+
∑
S∈Wn
1
|S|2
)
=
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈W
|S| 1|S|2 =
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈W
1
|S| = 1
F (x) =
√
x− 12
x4
Theorem 4.4. For any simple game W and for any i ∈ N , we have ξi(W ) ≥ 0.
Proof. The PHI ξ of a non-null simple gameW and a player i ∈ N is always greater than
zero. It is consequential that, in any non-null game, at least one winning coalition exists
(i.e., grand coalition N ). Thus, N ∈W 6= ∅ and N ∈Wi 6= ∅, and, as a consequence,
we have ξi(W ) = 1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2 > 0. In the case of a null game ξi(W ) = 0
∀i ∈ N since, in a null game, all players are zero players.
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Theorem 4.5. For any simple game W, PHI ξ satisfies the symmetry postulate.
Proof. Let us fix a simple game W. It is sufficient to prove that ξi(W ) = ξpi(i)(pi(W ))
for each i ∈ N and all permutations pi : N → N . In case of a null game, it is
straightforward to prove that symmetry holds since, in a null game, each player is zero
player. In the case of a non-null game W, we have:
ξi(W ) =
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2 =
1∑
T∈W
1
|T |
∑
S∈Wpi(i)
1
|S|2 = ξpi(i)(W )
Theorem 4.6. For any simple game W, PHI ξ satisfies the dominance postulate.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary weighted majority game [q; w1, ... , wn] and two distinct
players i, j ∈ N with weights wi, wj respectively such that wi ≥ wj . As in the proof
of Theorem 4.1, we can show that, if wi ≥ wj , then |Wi| ≥ |Wj |, and if Wj\Wi 6= ∅,
then for any winning coalition S ∈ (Wj\Wi), the coalition (S\{j}) ∪ {i} ∈ (Wi\Wj),
and |S| = |(S\{j}) ∪ {i}|. Hence, we have not only that |Wi\Wj | ≥ |Wj\Wi|, but
also
∑
S∈Wi\Wj
1
|S|2 ≥
∑
S∈Wj\Wi
1
|S|2 ; as a consequence, we immediately attain that
ξ satisfies the dominance postulate:
ξi(W ) =
∑
S∈Wi
1
|S|2∑
T∈W
1
|T |
=
∑
S∈Wi\Wj
1
|S|2 +
∑
S∈Wi
⋂
Wj
1
|S|2∑
T∈W
1
|T |
≥
∑
S∈Wj\Wi
1
|S|2 +
∑
S∈Wi
⋂
Wj
1
|S|2∑
T∈W
1
|T |
=
∑
S∈Wj
1
|S|2∑
T∈W
1
|T |
= ξj(W )
Example 4.1. Let us consider a game given by the following characteristic function:
v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 0, v({3}) = 0, v({2, 3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 1, v({1, 3}) = 1,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1. In Table 1, we present the payoffs assigned by the Rae, König and
Bräuninger, PGI, PHI θ and ξ indices to players in the considered game.
Table 1. Distribution of power in Example 4.1
Power index Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
R 7/8 5/8 5/8
KB 1 2/3 2/3
h 1/2 1/4 1/4
θ 3/7 2/7 2/7
ξ 22/48 13/48 13/48
Example 4.2. Let us consider a game W = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4},
{1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. In this game, there are only two minimal winning coalitions:
{1, 2}, {1, 3}. In Table 2, we present the payments assigned by the considered five
power indices to the players.
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Table 2. Distribution of power in Example 4.2
Power index Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
R 7/8 5/8 5/8 1/2
KB 1 2/3 2/3 1/2
h 1/2 1/4 1/4 0
θ 6/17 4/17 4/17 3/17
ξ 129/324 77/324 77/324 41/324
In Example 4.2 (Table 2), we can observe that PHI ξ violates the null property.
As we can observe in Examples 4.1 and 4.2, the power indices taken into account
in this paper split the total wins in different ways and assign different power to the
players, but give the same rankings to the players. An interesting fact is that some of
these power indices induce the same rankings of players, not only in the considered
examples, but also in any simple game. Namely, the König and Bräuninger, PHI θ,
and Rae indices rank players in the same way. Moreover, they give the same rankings
as the Banzhaf power index, since, for a given game W and a player i, all of these
indices (KB, θ, R, and Banzhaf indices) are positive affine transformations of |Wi|(see
Section 3 and (Bertini et al., 2013a)).
The bloc property is one of the most important properties necessary for power
indices to be useful for analysis of block-expansion mechanisms in the decision-making
bodies (see, for example, (Felsenthal and Machover, 1995; Jasiński, 2013)). The KB
and Rae indices satisfy bloc property, whereas the PGI index does not fulfill this
property (see (Bertini et al., 2013a)).
In Table 3, we summarize all results discussed in this section.
Table 3. Power indices R, KB, h, θ, ξ in comparison
Property Power index
R KB h θ ξ
Bloc yes yes no ? ?
Dominance yes yes no yes yes
Efficiency no no yes yes yes
Non-negativity yes yes yes yes yes
Null player no no yes no no
Symmetry yes yes yes yes yes
Range of power index in
a non-null game v, n ≥ 2 [0.5; 1] [0.5; 1] [0; 1]
[
1
2n−1 ;
2
n+1
]
?
By “?”, we denote that it is still an open problem.
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5. EXTENSIONS OF THE PHI INDICES TO THE GAME VALUES
In this section, we propose the extensions of the PHI indices (θ and ξ) to general
cooperative games. But we start with introducing the Public Good value.
Holler and Li in (1995) extended the PGI index to the Public Good value
introducing the concept of a real gaining coalition (RGC).
Definition 5.1. For a cooperative game (N, v), a subset S ⊆ N is called a real gaining
coalition (RGC) if, for any T ⊂ S, we have v(S)− v(T ) > 0.
Let RGC (v) denote a set of all real gaining coalitions in the game v, and by RGCi(v)
(or RGCi), we denote a set of all real gaining coalitions containing player i. In
a cooperative game, the concept of the real gaining coalition corresponds with the
concept of the minimal winning coalition in a simple game. Moreover, for any simple
game v, we have Wm(v) = RGC(v).
Definition 5.2. A player i ∈ N is a dummy player if he does not belong to any
S ∈ RGC(v).
In a general cooperative game, the concept of a dummy player corresponds with the
concept of a null player in a simple game. Therefore, similarly like in a simple game, in
any minimal winning coalition, all players contribute to its win, in general cooperative
game we have that if and only if all players contribute to the worth of a coalition, the
coalition is a RGC.
Holler and Li (1995) defined the Public Good value and its normalized version,
only taking into account the payoffs from real gaining coalitions (see Definition 5.3
and 5.4).
Definition 5.3. The Public Good value (or the Holler value) of cooperative game v
for a player i ∈ N is given by: HV i(v) = hi(v) =
∑
S∈RGCi v(S).
Normalizing the PGV value to the coalition payoff of the grand coalition N, we obtain
a normalized version of PGV.
Definition 5.4. The normalized Public Good value (or the normalized Holler value)
of cooperative game v for a player i ∈ N is given by: HVi(v) = hi(v) = hi(v)∑
j∈N hj(v)
v(N).
We remark that Holler and Li in (1995) axiomatized the Holler value with four
axioms: L1 axiom (efficiency), L2 axiom (mergeability), symmetry, and dummy player.
Following the idea of Holler and Li (1995), we propose the extensions of the PHI
indices θ and ξ from simple games to general ones in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In order to
state the definitions of the announced values, we need to first introduce the concept of
a gaining coalition (GC).
Definition 5.5. For a cooperative game (N, v), a subset S ⊆ N is called a gaining
coalition (GC) if v(S) > 0.
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Let GC (v) denote a set of all gaining coalitions in the game v, and by GCi(v) (or
GCi), we denote a set of all gaining coalitions containing player i. We remark that
the concept of the gaining coalition in a general cooperative game is equivalent to
the concept of the winning coalition in a simple game. Furthermore, for any simple
game v, we have W (v) = GC(v).
5.1. PUBLIC HELP VALUE θ
Let us introduce an extension of the PHI θ into a general game, considering only the
payoffs from GCs.
Definition 5.6. The absolute Public Help value θ (or the KB value) of cooperative
game v for a player i ∈ N is given by θi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi v(S) if a coalition S ⊆ N
exists such that v(S) > 0, otherwise θi(v) = 0.
We also propose the normalized (to the coalition payoff of grand coalition N ) version
of the PHV value.
Definition 5.7. The normalized Public Help value θ (or the KB value) of cooperative
game v for a player i ∈ N is given by θi(v) = θi(v)∑
j∈N θj(v)
v(N) if a coalition S ⊆ N
exists such thatv(S) > 0, otherwise θi(v) = 0.
Now, we prove that absolute and normalized Public Help values θ and θ satisfy
several properties. Namely, in Theorem 5.1, we prove that these values assign non-
negative payments to players. In Theorem 5.2, we show that the total gain v(N ) is
distributed by the normalized PHV θ. And finally, Theorem 5.3 states that θ and θ
are symmetric, which means that “symmetric” players received the same payment.
Theorem 5.1. For any cooperative game (v, N) and for any i ∈ N , we have θi(v) ≥ 0
and θi(v) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game. If a coalition S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0 does not
exist, then directly from Definitions 5.6 and 5.7, we have θi(v) = θ(v) = 0. Otherwise,
if a coalition S ⊆ N exists such that v(S) > 0, then v(N) > 0, since v is a monotonic
game and either |GC| > 0 and |GCi| > 0 for any i ∈ N . Thus, for any i ∈ N , we
have θi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi v(S) > 0 and θi(v) =
θi(v)∑
j∈N θj(v)
v(N) > 0, which completes the
proof.
Theorem 5.2. For any cooperative game (v, N ), we have
∑
i∈N θi(v) = v(N).
Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game. If a coalition S ⊆ N exists such that v(S) > 0,
then v(N) > 0, since v is a monotonic game and either |GC| > 0 and |GCi| > 0 for any
i ∈ N . Thus, for any i ∈ N , we have ∑i∈N θi(v) = ∑i∈N ∑S∈GCi v(S)∑
j∈N
∑
S∈GCj v(S)
v(N) =
v(N)
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈GCi v(S)∑
j∈N
∑
S∈GCj v(S)
= v(N). Otherwise, if a coalition S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0 does not
exist, then v(N) = 0, and from Definition 5.7, we see that θi(v) = 0 which completes
the proof.
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Theorem 5.3. For any cooperative game v, θi(v) = θpi(i)(pi(v)) and θi(v) = θpi(i)(pi(v))
for each i ∈ Nand all permutations pi : N → N .
Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game, i be an arbitrary player, and pi a permutation
on N. In case of a null game, we have that all players received zero (directly from
Definitions 5.6 and 5.7). Thus, the theorem holds. In case of a non-null game, we have:
θi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi v(S) =
∑
S∈GCpi(i) v(S) = θpi(i)(v) and θi(v) =
θi(v)∑
j∈N θj(v)
v(N) =
θpi(i)(v)∑
pi(j)∈N θpi(j)(v)
v(N) = θpi(i)(v).
5.2. PUBLIC HELP VALUE ξ
Let us introduce an extension of the PHI ξ into the general game. The Public Help
value ξ (PHV ξ ), like PHV θ , only regards payoffs from GCs.
Definition 5.8. The absolute Public Help value ξ of cooperative game v for a player
i ∈ N is given by ξi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi
v(S)
|S|2 if a coalition S ⊆ N exists such thatv(S) > 0,
otherwise ξi(v) = 0.
We also introduce the normalized (to the coalition payoff of grand coalition N ) version
of the PHV ξ value:
Definition 5.9. The normalized Public Help value ξ of cooperative game v for
a player i ∈ N is given by ξi(v) = v(N)∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
ξi(v) if a coalition S ⊆ N exists such
that v(S) > 0, otherwise ξi(v) = 0.
We state and prove that the absolute and normalized PHVs ξ and ξ satisfy the
properties considered for θ and θ in Section 5.1. This means the extended values
ξ and ξ preserve not only non-negativity (Theorem 5.4), but also the symmetry
(Theorem 5.6).
Theorem 5.4. For any cooperative game v and for any i ∈ N , we have ξi(v) ≥ 0 and
ξi(v) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game. If a coalition S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0 does not
exist, then we have ξi(v) = ξ(v) = 0 (directly from Definitions 5.8 and 5.9). Otherwise,
if a coalition S ⊆ N exists such that v(S) > 0, then v(N) > 0, since v is a monotonic
game and either |GC| > 0 and |GCi| > 0 for any i ∈ N . Thus, for any i ∈ N , we have
ξi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi
v(S)
|S|2 > 0 and ξi(v) =
v(N)∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S| > 0, which completes
the proof.
Theorem 5.5. For any cooperative game (v, N ), we have
∑
i∈N ξi(v) = v(N).
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Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game. If a coalition S ⊆ N exists such that v(S) > 0,
then v(N) > 0, since v is a monotonic game and either |GC| > 0 and |GCi| > 0 for
any i ∈ N .
Thus, for any i ∈ N , we have:
∑
i∈N
ξi(v) =
∑
i∈N
v(N)
∑
S∈GCi
v(S)
|S|2∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
= v(N)
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈GCi
v(S)
|S|2∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
= v(N)
∑
S∈GC |S|v(S)|S|2∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
= v(N)
∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|∑
S∈GC
v(S)
|S|
= v(N)
Otherwise, if a coalition S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0 does not exist, then v(N) = 0; and from
Definition 5.9, we have that ξi(v) = 0, which completes the proof.
It is not difficult to prove that both values ξ and ξ allocate equal payments to
symmetric players (see Theorem 5.6).
Theorem 5.6. For any cooperative game v, ξi(v) = ξpi(i)(pi(v)) and ξi(v) = ξpi(i)(pi(v))
where (pi(v))(S) = v(pi−1(S)) for every i ∈ N and all permutations pi : N → N .
Proof. Let (v, N ) be a cooperative game, i be an arbitrary player, and pi a permutation
on N. In case of a null game, we see that all players received zero (directly from
definitions 5.8 and 5.9). Thus, the theorem holds. In case of a non-null game, we have:
ξi(v) =
∑
S∈GCi
v(S)
|S|2 =
∑
S∈GCpi(i)
v(S)
|S|2 = ξpi(i)(v)
and
ξi(W ) =
v(N)∑
S∈GC
1
|S|
ξi(v) =
v(N)∑
S∈GC
1
|S|
ξpi(i)(v) = ξpi(i)(v)
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
In this paper, we analyzed from a different point of view some values and power indices
well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. We consider the Public
Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help
index (Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) (see also (Nevison
et al. 1978; Nevison, 1979)), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper were as
follows: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to
introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some
characterizations of the new index and values.
It is easy to see that the results shown in this paper are not exhaustive. As
developments can be many, we simply indicate that those may be of some interest (in
our humble opinion). Namely, the new index (PHI ξ) and two new values (PHV θ and
PHV ξ) introduced needed axiomatic derivations. Then, the algorithms for automatic
computation of new index and new values could be supplied. We suspect that Public
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Help indices θ and ξ satisfy the bloc property, but it is still an open problem. The
new power index could be compared to all of the other indices, taking into account
other properties; for example, those analyzed in (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998;
Bertini et al., 2013a, 2013b). Still, regarding ξ, it might be of some interest to analyze
its rankings and compare them with the rankings of other indices.
Last but not least, the new values and PHI indices could be extended to games
with a priori unions, with incompatibilities, with affinities, or with various probabilities
of coalition formation (see e.g., Fragnelli et al., 2009).
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APPENDIX
Here we present proof of the following identity:
n∑
k=1
k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
= (n+ 1)2n−2 ∀n ≥ 2 (3)
The identity (3) can be proven starting with the binomial identity:
(1 + x)n =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk for any real number x and n ≥ 1
.
Since
(
n
k
)
= nk
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
for n ≥ k > 0, the above binomial identity can be rewrit-
ten as:
(1 + x)n = 1 + n
n∑
k=1
1
k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
xk for any real number x (4)
Taking the derivative of the both parts of (4) with respect to x, we attain:
n(1 + x)n−1 = n
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
xk−1 (5)
Substituting 1 for x, we obtain the following identity:
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
= 2n−1 ∀n ≥ 2 (6)
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Now, taking the derivative of the both parts of (5) with respect to x, we attain
(n− 1)(1 + x)n−2 = ∑nk=1(k − 1)(n− 1k − 1
)
xk−2. Substituting 1 for x, we have:
(n− 1)2n−2 =
n∑
k=1
(k − 1)
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
(7)
From (7), we can calculate
∑n
k=1 k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
; and using identity (6), we conclude:
n∑
k=1
k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
= (n− 1)2n−2 +
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
= (n− 1)2n−2 + 2n−1 = (n+ 1)2n−2
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